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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is no longer a “future” problem.1 People are impacted
by climate change every day, ranging from catastrophic natural disasters2 to
continuous nuisances relating to air quality.3 Currently, judicial recourse for
these climate change injuries is inadequate.4 Until recently, overcoming the
issue of standing, as required for any judicial proceeding, has been nearly
impossible in environmental lawsuits.5 Utilizing standing as a scapegoat has
led to millions being injured and deprived of their right to property and
preservation of their environment without the ability to hold anyone
accountable.6 The overwhelming significance of the fundamental right to
property and the elusive right to life throughout national and international
law demonstrates the crucial need for adequate protection.7 Thus, this
Comment seeks to enhance the availability of private right of actions in
environmental international treaties and customs.
1. See Cristine Russell, A Scary Year for Climate Change, SCI. AM. (Nov. 2, 2019), https://blogs.
scientificamerican.com/observations/a-scary-year-for-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/H5X7-D5
7P] (stressing the urgency of climate change as the “future came faster than science had predicted”).
2. Eric Mack, In 2019 Climate Change Made These 15 Natural Disasters Even Worse, FORBES
(Dec. 27, 2019, 2:40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericmack/2019/12/27/climate-changedrove-the-price-tag-for-15-disasters-over-a-billion-dollars-each/#796eff5d7844 [https://perma.cc/
66AB-AULT] (“The British charity Christian Aid reports that climate change amplified 15 extreme
weather disasters in 2019 that caused at least a billion dollars in damage in each case . . . .”); see also
Tara Law, Australia’s Wildfires and Climate Change Are Making One Another Worse in a Vicious, Devastating
Circle, TIME (Jan. 7, 2020), https://time.com/5759964/australian-bushfires-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/G9SZ-3L7Z] (“Climate scientists warn that the scale and devastation of the
[Australian] wildfires are clear examples of the way climate change can intensify natural disasters.”).
3. See, e.g., Complaint at 8–38, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705
(D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015) (highlighting each plaintiff’s individual injuries because of climate change,
including aggravation of environmental allergies).
4. Id.
5. See William Blake Ogden, Note, Improving Standing Doctrine to Better Protect the Environment:
How the United States Can Learn from Ecuador’s Rights of Nature, 46 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2018)
(identifying standing as the biggest issue facing environmental plaintiffs).
6. See id. (identifying standing as the biggest issue facing environmental plaintiffs).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (solidifying the constitutional guarantee of the right to life, liberty,
and property); see also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012) (codifying
the United States’ declaration to protect the environment for future generations); North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Jan. 1, 1994, 32 I.L.M 1480, 2 (emphasizing the
importance of physical environmental conditions in sustaining the “well-being of present and future
generations”); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 6, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (recognizing
every child’s “inherent right to life”); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (classifying the Due Process rights as “fundamental” to American society); Lessee of
Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 355–56 (1840) (granting property rights to descendants under an
international treaty).
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Recognizing the environmental obligations in international treaties only
bolsters liability against the United States if a private right of action exists.
International treaties are carefully vetted and debated before the legislature
after being negotiated by the executive branch.8 Nevertheless, recent
Supreme Court decisions emphasize an insufficiency of treaty enforcement
without additional legislative approval.9 The additional approval is
unnecessary as treaties are on the same playing field as the Constitution,
which has never been held to require legislative approval prior to
enforcement.
Similarly, reclaiming the public trust doctrine—which emphasizes future
generations as the beneficiaries of the environment—under the
internationally recognized custom of intergenerational equity, would add
another layer to environmental litigation.10 The United States government
pledged to act as trustee and preserve the environment for the
beneficiaries.11 Preservation of the environment for future generations is
also conceptualized in international law as the principle of intergenerational
equity.12 As the beneficiary of the environment, present and future
generations retain a property right in the sanctity of the environment. While
the details of trust law are beyond the scope of this Comment, the trustee is
generally legally accountable for property rights held by a beneficiary.
Beginning with an analysis of the national claims brought by
environmental litigants will provide a general basis for the international
treaty arguments. To fully grasp the national claims, this Comment will
provide a brief summary of the current environmental statutes enacted.
This summary will include an explanation of the history and context of the
public trust doctrine and the constitutional right to life and property under
the Fifth Amendment. This Comment will then discuss the international
equivalents showing that intergenerational equity and treaty obligations are
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
9. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 515 (2008) (“Our Framers established a careful set of
procedures that must be followed before federal law can be created under the Constitution—vesting
that decision in the political branches, subject to checks and balances.”) (citing CONST. art. II, § 7).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012) (codifying the public trust doctrine).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A) (2012) (“The President shall designate . . . federal officials who
shall act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources[.]”).
12. Lynda M. Collins, Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity in Global Environmental
Governance, 30 DALHOUSIE L.J. 79, 93 (Aug. 25, 2010) (citing Edith Brown Weiss, IN
FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989) (defining intergenerational equity as the present generation
acting as beneficiary and trustee of the Earth’s resources).
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binding on the United States. Explanation of these principles will be
followed by a high-level summary of the groundbreaking Juliana v. United
States13 case, which utilizes environmental claims under the United States
Constitution. Finally, this Comment will then demonstrate the necessity of
a private right of action under international treaties to bolster the Juliana
claims and ensure governmental liability for our depreciating environment.
Declining to recognize these treaty obligations essentially renders the
fundamental right to life due to unsafe living conditions and the right to
property a mere façade enforcement wise.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. A Summary of Climate Change and Current United States Policies
Climate change has been deemed one of the greatest public policy
concerns of this generation.14 The effects of climate change are impossible
to ignore with rising sea levels,15 escalating temperatures,16 and more
However, these
catastrophic weather events than ever before.17
increasingly horrific events are not enough to instigate proper measures on
an international scale. At the United Nations Climate Change Summit in
December 2019, frustrations arose at the blatant disconnect between

13. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018).
14. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REPORT OF
THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON ITS FIFTEENTH SESSION, HELD IN COPENHAGEN FROM
7 TO 19 DECEMBER 2009 at 5, (March 30, 2010), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/
cop15/eng/11a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/45NK-4FE5] (categorizing climate change as “one of the
greatest challenges of our time”); see also Elaine Kamarck, The Challenging Politics of Climate Change,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-challenging-politics-ofclimate-change/ [https://perma.cc/ZW2T-W8F8] (explaining climate change is the “toughest, most
intractable political issue we, as a society, have ever faced”).
15. See R.S. Nerem et al., Climate-Change—Driven Accelerated Sea-Level Rise Detected in the Altimeter
Era, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.
pnas.org/content/115/9/2022 [https://perma.cc/6JHS-HM5Q] (summarizing scientific data
demonstrating the increased sea levels over a twenty-five-year period).
16. See NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally, NASA (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/news/20170118/ [https://perma.cc/XU85-YGLC] (proving
the average temperature of the Earth has risen two degrees Fahrenheit from 1880–2016).
17. See 1 D.J. WUEBBLES ET AL., CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 257–76 (2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR_
Ch9_Extreme_Storms.pdf [https://perma.cc/P552-YVPU] (demonstrating significant increase in
severity and frequency of storms throughout the U.S.).
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national leaders and reality.18 “Instead of leading the charge for more
ambition, most of the large emitters were missing in action or
obstructive.”19 In particular, the United States was the “major resistor”
when the topic of liability for damages caused by climate change was
discussed.20
Despite being one of the largest carbon emitters in the world, the United
States continuously refuses to implement effective measures to reduce their
contributions to climate change.21 In fact, the current administration is
actually taking steps backwards by removing measures previously enacted.22
Not only are we failing to implement domestic measures to combat global
warming, but the United States is now in direct violation of several
prominent environmental treaties.23 The domestic measures that remain in
place are outdated24 and essentially ineffective.
Environmental awareness became a prominent issue in the 1970s.25
With the invention of televisions, the American public was given immediate
18. Laurel Wamsley, U.N. Climate Summit Goes To Extra Time, But Ends With Major Questions
Unresolved, NPR (Dec. 15, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/15/788241846/u-nclimate-summit-goes-to-extra-time-but-ends-with-major-questions-unresolved [https://perma.cc/T6
EG-FNE8].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Complaint at 4–7, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705
(D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015).
22. See Rebecca Hersher, U.S. Formally Begins to Leave the Paris Climate Agreement, NPR (Nov. 4,
2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/04/773474657/u-s-formally-begins-to-leave-the-paris-climateagreement [https://perma.cc/DC34-CETD] (revealing the Trump administrations withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement and systematic attempts to “roll back federal limits on carbon emissions . . .”);
see also Nadia Popovich et al., 95 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump, NY TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks.
html [https://perma.cc/M3QE-2YTG] (listing specific environmental statutes being “rolled back”
under the Trump Administration).
23. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4(2)(a)–(b), March 21,
1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (failing to reach 1990 greenhouse gas emissions is a treaty violation); see also
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation art. 6, Jan. 1, 1994, 32 I.L.M 1480 (making
the denial of private access to judicial proceedings within the United States a treaty violation); Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 2(2)(b), Sept. 22, 1988, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293
(making the failure to take “appropriate” legislative action to ensure climate protection a treaty
violation).
24. See David W. Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Congressional
Abdication, 25 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 49, 51 (2014) (explaining the last major federal
environmental statute was enacted in 1990).
25. See Richard N. L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE ENV’T L. &
POL’Y F. 223, 226 (2011) (analyzing the creation of the EPA through the historical context of
environmental concerns).
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first-hand knowledge of several environmental catastrophes.26 As a result
of this newly acquired knowledge, the government was met with strong
public demand for action to protect and restore the deteriorating
environment.27 It was against this backdrop that President Nixon and
Congress created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to begin
brainstorming resolutions to meet the public demand.28
Congress responded almost immediately by enacting the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on January 1, 1970, which ignited “an
explosion” of environmental regulations.29 Within five years, more than
ten major environmental acts were passed by Congress.30 This trend
continued until 1990, which was the last year any major federal
environmental legislation was passed.31 “Since that time, the political
consensus necessary for enactment of statutory authority for new or
expanded mandatory regulatory programs to achieve desired environmental
outcomes has been impossible to obtain.”32 Therefore, the outdated policies,
with only minor adjustments, remain the exclusive statutory authority
regulating environmental protection despite the increasing complexity and
scale of environmental challenges.
NEPA was enacted to provide a basic framework for governmental
awareness of environmental concerns prior to implementation of major

26. See id. (referencing smog, radioactive fallout, pesticide use, oil spills, fires, oxygen depletion
in Lake Erie, and elsewhere).
27. See id. (“[A]n extraordinary outburst of mass public pressure for federal action to address
the widespread pollution problems that had resulted from the vast post-war growth in industrial
production and mass consumption.”).
28. See id. (describing the creation of the EPA spurred by President Nixon on the heels of the
environmental awareness movement in 1970).
29. See Case, supra note 24, at 50 (quoting President Nixon declaring the 1970s the “decade of
the environment” and summarizing the “explosion of legislative activity” that followed the execution
of the NEPA).
30. See Phil Wisman, EPA History (1970–1985), EPA (Nov. 1985), https://archive.epa.gov/
epa/aboutepa/epa-history-1970-1985.html [https://perma.cc/YU47-D7KA] (listing examples of
environmental acts enacted in the 1970s: the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Marine Protection
Research and Sanctuaries Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, the Deepwater Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act, the Water Resources Planning act, the Water Resources Research Act, and the
Environmental Quality Improvement Act).
31. See Case, supra note 24, at 51 (generalizing the three decades of environmental legislative
activity from 1970–1990).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
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federal projects.33 Any obligation under NEPA is limited to the
implementation of major federal activities context.34 Therefore, NEPA
does not require the government to enforce “the responsibilities of each
generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations” or
“assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings.”35 More pertinent to this Comment is the
fact that NEPA also does not provide a private right of action against the
government itself for any violations.36 Instead, civilians must bring
violation actions under the Administrative Procedure Act against the
EPA.37
NEPA’s liability and enforcement shortcomings remain active and
substantively unchanged to this day. One of the supplemental legislative
enactments on the coat tails of NEPA was the Clean Air Act.38 The Clean
Air Act was enacted “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air
resources[.]”39 Section 7604 of the Clean Air Act also provides a private
cause of action under the citizens suit provision.40 The citizens suit
provision allows for any person to sue the United States or any other
governmental agency violating the Clean Air Act.41
Nevertheless, litigation under the Clean Air Act has resulted in piecemeal
litigation that is ineffective for several reasons. First, the courts are hesitant
to enjoin activities approved by the EPA due to the technical nature of
environmental regulations.42 Second, courts are also unlikely to interfere
based on the amount of deference given to agency discretion and

33. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2012) (codifying the government’s “continuing responsibility . . . to
use all practicable means . . . to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources”).
34. See Case, supra note 24, at 56 (explaining NEPA’s primary function was mandating agencies
to “begin considering environmental concerns when making decisions about major federal activities”).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b)(1)–(2) (utilizing the word “may” to negate liability).
36. Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 630 (6th Cir. 1997).
37. Id. at 630–31.
38. See Case, supra note 24, at 56 (summarizing environmental acts enacted between 1970–1980,
with the first after NEPA being the Clean Air Act).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012) (“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf[.]”).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1).
42. See New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1981) (acknowledging the
courts are reluctant to enjoying “activities which have been considered and specifically authorized by
the government” because it implicates complex areas of law).
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interpretation of its own regulations.43 Therefore, if the main allegation is
that the EPA’s regulations are insufficient, then there is truly no remedy to
provide because courts refuse to interfere or defer to the EPA to interpret
compliance.44 Inadequate judicial remedies for violations have left the
American people vulnerable to the environmental repercussions of
ineffective regulations.
B. The Government’s Commitment Under the Public Trust Doctrine
In addition to specific environmental regulations, the United States also
recognizes the public trust doctrine.45 The public trust doctrine is “the
principle that certain natural resources are preserved for public use, and that
the government must protect and maintain these resources for the
people.”46 Congress’s declaring the federal government will act in a manner
that ensures the welfare of the climate for present and future generations47
clearly illustrates a commitment to the public trust doctrine. This
declaration solidified the government’s role as the environmental trustee for
forthcoming generations.48 Certain federal agencies have been designated
by the president to act as trustee for certain natural resources.49
Collectively, these governmental actions demonstrate support of the public
trust doctrine, which has long been recognized by the judiciary.50
43. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(reiterating that a challenge to an agency’s reasonable statutory construction centered on “wisdom of
the agency’s policy” will fail).
44. See Costle, 666 F.2d at 33 (“Congress has indicated that regulation may be better achieved
through a comprehensive statutory approach than through ad hoc common law remedies.”).
45. See Rebecca LaGrandeur Harms, Preserving the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine: Maintaining
Flexibility in an Era of Increasing Statutes, 39 UC DAVIS 97, 98 (Jan. 25, 2016, 1:07 PM),
https://law.ucdavis.edu/centers/environmental/files/Doremus%20Writing%20Winners/2015LaGr
andeur.pdf [https://perma.cc/92U2-DZ5G] (“The United States adopted the doctrine from England’s
common law system.”).
46. Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012).
48. Id. (b)(1).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A) (2012) (“The President shall designate . . . Federal officials
who shall act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources[.]”); see also Complaint at 82,
Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015) (listing the
USDA, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and Department of the Interior as federal
agencies acting on behalf of public as trustees).
50. Even though the context of these statutory trust provisions involves the government
seeking compensation on behalf of the public as trustee, it seems analogous that the government would
also have a duty to protect the land from destruction as well. See Complaint at 82, Juliana v. United
States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015) (relying on the trust
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C. The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee to Life, Liberty, and Property
The underlying rationale mentioned in each of the policies above is
rooted in the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property.”51 As reinforced throughout history, life, liberty, and property
are fundamental rights given to all United States citizens.52 These
fundamental rights are unconstitutionally infringed by the failure to protect
the Earth’s environment.53 Climate change infringes on the inherent right
to resources held in public trust and loss of life or property due to increased
flooding and storm damage caused by catastrophic weather events.54
D. An Overlap Between Domestic Law and International Law
Intergenerational equity is an international customary law principle that
significantly overlaps with the public trust doctrine. Intergenerational equity
is the responsibility of the present generation—acting as both beneficiary
and trustee of the Earth’s resources—to protect the environment for future
generations.55 A balance must be struck between the present generation’s
right to use and enjoy resources while adhering to the trustee obligation to
conserve the same resources for future generations.56 Recognition of the
obligation to future generations can be seen in diverse cultures and political
regimes across the world, including the United States.57
Likewise, the right to life is overwhelmingly pervasive throughout
international law. Specifically, many universally accepted treaties contain the
provisions to argue the government was holding the environment in public trust for future
generations); see also Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1102 (D. Or. 2018) (refusing to
grant summary judgment on the public trust claim because the “doctrine is deeply rooted in our nation’s
history and that plaintiffs’ claims are viable was [not] clearly erroneous”).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
52. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
Due Process rights are “based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and
feelings . . . as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history”);
see also U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF., FIFTH AMENDMENT: RIGHT OF PERSONS 1356 (1992) (showing the
guaranties of the Fifth Amendment are rooted in the Magna Carta).
53. Complaint at 91–92, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705TC (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015).
54. Id.
55. See Collins, supra note 12, at 87 (defining intergenerational equity).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 88–90 (providing historical examples in various cultures of the intergenerational
equity principle, including evidence of the United States acknowledging the principle in the context of
future debt passing to future generations).
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fundamental right not to have one’s life arbitrarily ended.58 Shockingly, the
United States has been reluctant to execute treaties preserving the right to
life.59 However, there is one treaty recognizing the right to life that the
United States did eventually ratify,60 obviously with express reservations.
E. The True Meaning of the Supremacy Clause
By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, any treaty signed and ratified by the
United States becomes the “supreme Law of the Land.”61 Notably, the
Supremacy Clause explicitly provides for “all treaties” to be the “supreme
Law of the Land.”62 The historical context of the Supremacy Clause
solidifies the Founders’ intent to have all treaties be judicially enforceable.
Justice Story surmised the congressional intention behind the Supremacy
Clause was to eliminate the historical disregard of treaty obligations by
states.63 Intentionally and deliberately giving treaties the status of “law”
made them “enforceable in the ordinary courts.”64
III. JULIANA V. UNITED STATES—THE GOLDEN ENVIRONMENTAL CASE
“A livable future includes the opportunity to drink clean water, to grow
food, to be free from direct and imminent property damage caused by
extreme weather events, to benefit from the use of property, and to enjoy

58. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Mar. 23, 1976, 99 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter Civil and Political Rights] (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”); see also Convention on
the Rights of the Child art. 6, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“States Parties recognize that every child
has the inherent right to life.”).
59. See Where the United States Stands on 10 International Human Rights Treaties, CIVILRIGHTS.ORG
(Dec. 10, 2013), https://civilrights.org/edfund/resource/where-the-united-states-stands-on-10-inter
national-human-rights-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/3Q2D-EE62] [hereinafter Where the United States
Stands] (showing the United States signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in 1977, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1995 but, despite near universal
acceptance, have refused to ratify either treaty).
60. Civil and Political Rights, supra note 58, at 111.
61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
62. Id.; see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796) (“It is the declared will of the
people of the United States that every treaty made, by the authority of the United States, shall be superior
to the Constitution and laws of any individual State[.]”) (emphasis added).
63. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND
STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 696 (1833).
64. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1082, 1085 (1992).
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the abundant and rich biodiversity of our nation.”65 Youths from across
the country have come together to hold their government accountable for
the unprecedented damage caused by global warming.66 The Youth
Plaintiffs aimed their legal claims against the United States—the sovereign
trustee under the public trust doctrine—the President, and numerous
governmental and state agencies.67
Initially, Juliana plaintiffs sought relief under the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment.68 Specifically, defendants’
willful actions over the past fifty years infringed on plaintiffs’ rights to life,
Particular damages asserted include the
liberty, and property.69
infringement of multiple basic human rights ranging from access to clean
air, water, and food to encroaching on religious practices and raising a
family.70 Plaintiffs request future generations be treated as a protected class
due to their inability to vote or to truly influence defendants’ actions.71
Because the majority of plaintiffs “reside in this division of the judicial
district, and events, omissions, and harms giving rise to the claims herein
arise in substantial part in this division,” the only avenue for redress
concerning the infringement of these basic human rights lies with the
District Court of Oregon.72
The other most notable claim in Juliana fell under the public trust
doctrine.73 “As sovereign trustees, [d]efendants have” failed in their
responsibility to safeguard future beneficiaries’ property interest in natural
resources.74 In fact, Youth Plaintiffs, as future beneficiaries, claimed that
Defendants contributed to the substantial impairment of natural resources
when they required affirmative action to preserve the resources was
necessary.75

65. Complaint at 96, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D.
Or. Aug. 12, 2015).
66. See id. at 16–92 (introducing individual plaintiffs from Oregon, Colorado, Pennsylvania,
Arizona, South Dakota, Hawaii, New York, Alaska, Washington, Florida, and Louisiana).
67. Id. at 98–130.
68. Id. at 278, 291.
69. Id. at 286.
70. Id. at 283.
71. Id. at 297.
72. Id. at 15.
73. Id. at 308.
74. Id. at 309.
75. Id. at 308–09.
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IV. THE NEED FOR TREATY OBLIGATIONS AS A SUPPLEMENT
TO CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
Prior to Juliana, most environmental lawsuits in the United States met
similar fates. Challenges to NEPA, the Clean Air Act, and the public trust
doctrine have all been dismissed under the guise of standing deficiencies.76
Reliance on the standing doctrine effectively removes “any direct claim to
justice.”77 Standing issues in environmental lawsuits can be gleaned from
an overview of three prominent cases.
A. Previous Environmental Cases—Legitimate Holdings or Scapegoating?
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation78 is one of the most prominent and
widely cited environmental lawsuits in the United States. Lujan was a case
brought by the National Wildlife Federation alleging that several federal
parties violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 and
NEPA.79 As NEPA does not provide a private right of action, the Wildlife
Federation used the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to bring these
allegations against the federal agencies.80 Standing under the APA is a twoprong test.81 First, the party seeking a right to sue must establish that the
federal agency took action that affected him “in [a] specified fashion.”82
Second, the party must show that he suffered legal injury or that he was
“adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant
statute.”83
Lujan met its demise when the Supreme Court held the injury requirement
had not been met.84 While the Court acknowledges judicial intervention
“may ultimately have the effect of requiring a regulation, a series of
regulations, or even a whole ‘program’ to be revised by the agency in order
76. See Ogden, supra note 5, at 2 (citing Holly Doremus, The Persistent Problem of Standing in
Environmental Law, 40 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10956 (2010)) (categorizing standing
requirements as the “most persistent constitutional quandary for environmental law”).
77. Francisco Benzoni, Note, Environmental Standing: Who Determines the Value of Other Life?,
18 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 347, 347 (2008).
78. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
79. Id. at 875.
80. Id. at 872, 882 (discussing standing requirements under Section 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act “[s]ince neither the FLPMA nor NEPA provides a private right of action”).
81. Id. at 882.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 883.
84. See id. at 892 (“[A]ctions will not be ripe for challenge until some further agency action or
inaction more immediately harming the plaintiff occurs.”).
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to avoid the unlawful result,” the Court ultimately held these “sweeping
actions” should be left to other governmental branches.85 This holding had
detrimental effects on the environmental lawsuits that followed.
Thirteen years after Lujan, the Ninth Circuit heard Washington
Environmental Council v. Bellon.86 Bellon was a direct action under the citizensuit provision of the Clean Air Act.87 Under the citizen-suit provision,
standing is established based on Article III requirements: “(1) he or she
suffered an injury-in-fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3)
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.”88 For an
environmental plaintiff, the injury-in-fact requirement may be satisfied by
showing the alleged governmental conduct “impairs” the plaintiff’s
“economic interests or ‘[a]esthetic and environmental well-being’” or could
cause future harm to those interests.89
Unlike Lujan,90 the Bellon court found sufficient injury to satisfy the first
standing prong.91 However, the court ultimately determined that
Washington Environmental Council failed to satisfy the remaining two
standing prongs.92 While analyzing the causality prong, the court
enunciated a critical standing hurdle to deny plaintiffs any sort of relief.93
The court stated, “[i]t is currently beyond the scope of existing science to
identify a specific source of [greenhouse gas] emissions and designate it as
the cause of specific climate impacts at an exact location.”94 Relying on this
same scientific uncertainty hurdle, the court also determined that plaintiff’s
injuries would continue regardless of an injunction against defendants.95

85. Id. at 894.
86. Wash. Env’t Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013).
87. Id. at 1135.
88. Id. at 1139–40 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
89. Id. at 1140 (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 526 F.3d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 2008)).
90. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 892.
91. See Wash. Env’t Council, 732 F.3d at 1141 (finding plaintiffs satisfied the injury prong under
the citizens suit provision).
92. See id. at 1147 (“Plaintiffs have not met their burden in satisfying the ‘irreducible
constitutional minimum’ requirements for Article III standing under either the causality or
redressability prong.”).
93. See id. at 1144 (blaming the “multitude of independent third parties” as contributing factors
to plaintiffs’ injuries).
94. See id. at 1143 (citing Letter from Dir., U.S. Geological Surv., to Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv. (May 14, 2008)).
95. See id. at 1146–47 (determining Plaintiff’s injuries to be ongoing, regardless of an injunction).
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Public trust doctrine claims have been met with similar unfortunate
results. In Kanuk v. State Department of Natural Resources,96 a group of minors
from Alaska claimed the state violated the public trust doctrine by failing to
protect the atmosphere.97 The Kanuk court found the plaintiffs had proper
standing and did not raise a political question.98 Nevertheless, the court
still affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ suit on prudential grounds that a
“court that ‘know[s] at the commencement of litigation that it will exercise
its broad statutory discretion to decline declaratory relief[]’ need not
undertake a ‘wasteful expenditure of judicial resources’ in ‘the futile exercise
of hearing a case on the merits first.’”99 The court reasoned that the
declaratory relief sought would be insufficient to remedy the public trust
situation and to provide the plaintiffs relief.100
It is obvious the courts are dutifully relying on the holding in Lujan,101
but the tides could rightfully change. Juliana is a monumental case,
regardless of how the case is ultimately resolved.102 Even though Juliana
was dismissed for lack of standing by a strongly divided Ninth Circuit panel,
the court made unprecedented remarks on the sufficiency of evidence
pertaining to the injury and causation elements.103 For the first time, a
court actually discussed the merits of an environmental suit and the
government’s undeniable infringement on fundamental rights.104 Ensuring
that Juliana105 is not just an anomaly may require enforcement of stronger
obligations on the United States government as one court has already
denounced the actions of the Juliana court.106 Reviving the Court’s
96. Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014).
97. Id. at 1090.
98. Id. at 1099.
99. See id. at 1101 (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287–88 (1995)).
100. See id. at 1102 (declaring the atmosphere subject to public trust doctrine would not have a
sufficient impact on greenhouse gas emissions in Alaska and would not provide proper relief or
protection from plaintiffs’ injuries).
101. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
102. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (awaiting a ruling on plaintiff’s
motion to amend their complaint to adjust the remedy sought).
103. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding copious evidence
of the “havoc on the Earth’s climate” caused by fossil fuels and conclusive evidence that the federal
government has “long understood the risks of fossil fuel use” while affirmatively promoting such use).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237, 254 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (finding the
reasoning of the Juliana court unpersuasive and refusing to acknowledge the federal government has
“an affirmative duty to protect all land and resources within the United States—enforceable as a
substantive due process right under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments”).
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willingness to recognize a private right of action in international treaties may
be the enforcement needed to see true change in American environmental
policy.
B. Recognition of Individual Rights Under International Treaties
Individual rights under international treaties and customs are not novel.
Other countries utilize these rights to force governmental compliance with
environmental obligations.107 Recently, The Hague Court of Appeal
upheld a judgment forcing the Netherlands to comply with environmental
obligations based on a lawsuit brought by a citizen’s foundation,
Urgenda.108 The court found that, by failing to meet sufficient emission
reduction goals, the Netherlands had not done enough to prevent climate
change.109 Relying on the right to life obligation under Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),110 and the fact the
Netherlands is an Annex I state under the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the court determined the Netherlands had a
“positive obligation” to protect citizens, notwithstanding scientific
uncertainty111 or any possible reduction being a mere “drop in the ocean”
globally.112
The European Union is not the only judicial body enforcing
environmental treaty obligations. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has also imposed liability on countries found committing environmental law
violations.113 Despite having made similar international commitments to
107. See, e.g., Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, Ruling, ¶ 71
(The Hague Court of Appeal Oct. 9, 2018), https://elaw.org/system/files/attachments/public
resource/Urgenda_2018_Appeal_Decision_Eng.pdf?_ga=2.199993575.856741879.1571441224-5643
06796.1571441224 (relying on the European Convention on Human Rights and United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change to hold Netherlands liable for insufficient action relating
to environmental protection).
108. See id. at ¶ 76 (upholding the district court’s determination that the Netherlands was acting
unlawfully and “should reduce emissions by at least 25% by end-2020”).
109. Id. at ¶ 71.
110. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 2, Sept. 3, 1953, ETS 5.
111. See source cited supra note 107 (“[T]he State has a positive obligation to protect the lives
of citizens within its jurisdiction under Article 2 ECHR . . . If the government knows that there is a
real and imminent threat, the State must take precautionary measures to prevent infringement as far as
possible.”).
112. Id. at ¶ 28.
113. See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Nicar. v. Costa Rica),
Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665 (Dec. 16) (holding Nicaragua liable for international environmental law
violations in Costa Rica); see also Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J.
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environmental preservation and every citizen’s right to life, the United States
fails to judicially recognize these obligations in the context of litigation.114
As discussed above, the judiciary refuses to hold the United States
government accountable for environmental preservation while using
standing as an excuse.115 Therefore, enforcement of these international
commitments should produce results similar to those found in the Hague
appellate court and the ICJ.
C. A Summary of International Treaties and Policies at Play
1.

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

One potential treaty violation can be found by the United States’ noncompliance with the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC). NAAEC is the environmental side agreement to
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).116 Under the
NAAEC, the United States, Canada, and Mexico created a framework for
enhancing environmental protection within their respective territories.117
The framework obligates each country to “ensure that its laws and
regulations provide for high levels of environmental protection[.]”118
While “high levels” of protection is not defined within the treaty, the current

Rep. 348 (March 31) (separate opinion by Cançado Trindade, J.) (applying intergenerational equity,
international environmental law, and international human rights law, even in the face of scientific
uncertainty).
114. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 7, at art. 3
(ensuring the laws and regulations in the United States provide for a “high level” of environmental
protection); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 23, at art. 2(1)
(promising adequate measures will be implemented to protect “human health and the environment”);
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 58, at art. 6 (“Every human being has the inherent right to life.”).
115. See generally supra Part II (“Utilizing standing as a scapegoat has led to millions being injured
and deprived of their right property and preservation of their environment without the ability to hold
anyone accountable.”).
116. See Clifford T. Cosgrove, The NAAEC After Ten Years: A Qualitative Assessment of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers 8629, 2 (2005) (discussing the NAAEC in relation to the NAFTA and expressing
the interconnectivity of NAFTA and the NAAEC); see also North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, supra note 7, at pmbl. (“acknowledging” and “reconfirming” NAFTA).
117. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 7, at pmbl.,
(“Convinced of the benefits to be derived from a framework . . . to facilitate effective cooperation on
the conversation, protection and enhancement of the environment in their territories[.]”).
118. See id. at art. 3.
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administration’s complete disregard for the environment cannot sufficiently
satisfy this obligation.119
Under the NAAEC, the United States also agreed to monitor and
investigate any perceived violation of the environmental laws and
regulations, as well as police and enforce those affirmed violations.120 The
policing and enforcing of laws and regulations are the biggest glaring
violations of the NAAEC. Article 6 of the NAAEC ensures all “interested
persons” have the right to private judicial remedies for violations of
environmental laws and regulations.121 Despite the United States agreeing
to “ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law . . .
have appropriate access to . . . judicial proceedings for the enforcement of
the Party’s environmental laws and regulations,”122 the United States has
continuously failed to provide access to adequate judicial proceedings.123
Because individuals have a legally recognized interest in the preservation of
their environment under the public trust doctrine, violations of the NAAEC
will continue until the judiciary provides proper access to judiciary
proceedings.
2.

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer

While NAAEC is the most recently executed environmental treaty, it is
not the only binding treaty upon this country. The United States is also a
party to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(Vienna Convention), which entered into force in 1988.124 After ratifying
and executing the Vienna Convention, the United States became obligated
to “take appropriate measures . . . to protect human health and the
119. See Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, 95 Environmental Rules
Being Rolled Back Under Trump, NY TIMES (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interact
ive/2019/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/M6F6-TBLK] (identifying
ninety-five environmental “rollbacks” that will increase greenhouse gas emissions and poor air quality).
120. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 7,
at art. 5(1)(b), 5(1)(j) (outlining the required government enforcement mechanisms).
121. See id. at art. 6, (requiring the United States to provide private access to judicial
proceedings).
122. See id. at art. 6(2).
123. See Wash. Env’t Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding causality
and redressability of injury insufficient to maintain standing); Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F.
Supp. 3d 237, 250 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (dismissing claims for lack of standing without reaching merits);
Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1103 (Alaska 2014) (holding minors proved sufficient
standing to bring suit against the state, but ultimately dismissing case because declaratory relief sought
would not have remedied the situation).
124. See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 23.
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environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human
activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer.”125
Appropriate measures contemplated by the Vienna Convention included
legislative measures ensuring environmental protection.126 Legislative
measures must be appropriate in the context of each parties’ capabilities.127
While the United States has enacted legislative measures concerning
environmental preservation,128 the adequacy of those measures is clearly at
issue. Despite environmental regulations being in place, carbon emissions
have reached an all-time high.129 Considering the United States contributes
over twenty-five percent of world-wide carbon emissions,130 our efforts to
protect the environment should not be “critically insufficient.”131 The lack
of adequate environmental efforts in correlation with what the United States
is capable of is a direct violation of the Vienna Convention.
3.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

One of the biggest indicators that the United States agrees that global
cooperation is necessary to protect the environment for future generations
is the ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).132 Beginning with the preamble, the UNFCCC is
infiltrated with the importance of proper regulation of climate change.133
The overall objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilize greenhouse gas

125. See id. at art. 2(1).
126. See id. at art. 2(2)(b) (obligating parties to “adopt appropriate legislative or administrative
measures . . . to control, limit, reduce, or prevent” harm to the ozone layer).
127. See id. at art. 2(2).
128. For a summary of environmental legislation: see Case, supra note 23, at 56 (discussing the
environmental measures of the United States) (explaining the preventative measures taken by the
United States).
129. See Russell, supra note 1.
130. Complaint at 151, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705
(D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015).
131. See Kieran Mulvaney, Climate Change Report Card: These Countries Are Reaching Targets, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/09/
climate-change-report-card-co2-emissions/ [https://perma.cc/R8LU-RJVK] (highlighting the current
Administration’s hostility toward climate policy and categorizing our efforts as “barely trying”).
132. See Complaint at 145, Juliana, (discussing ratification of UNFCC as evidence of
“overwhelming weight” in support of protecting the atmosphere under the principles of
intergenerational equity).
133. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 23, at pmbl.
(beginning with the acknowledgment of the effect Earth’s climate has on humankind, followed by the
recognition that effective environmental regulation is crucial).
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emissions.134 In achieving a stabilization of gas emissions, each country135
committed to adopting policies which would return emissions to 1990
levels.136 While the full scientific analysis of 1990 greenhouse gas emission
levels are beyond the scope of this Comment, the most recent EPA report
to UNFCCC shows emissions were still well above 1990 levels.137
Several years after ratification of the UNFCCC, the UNFCCC parties
negotiated the Kyoto Protocol expanding the affirmative actions required
by Annex I countries.138 While other Annex I countries went on to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol, the United States was noticeably missing.139 Other
prominent Annex I countries followed suit and withdrew their signatures
from the Protocol.140 This domino effect shows the enormous impact and
influence the United States has on global environmental goals. A laissezfaire attitude towards environmental concerns by such an influential country
will only exacerbate an already dire situation.
4.

Copenhagen Accord

Although the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, in 2009 the
United States participated in the Copenhagen Accord under the
UNFCCC.141 In response to the Copenhagen Accord, the United States
pledged to reduce its 2005 greenhouse gas emission levels by seventeen
percent.142 While seventeen percent seems ideal, the measurement of 2005
levels truly only results in a three percent deduction from 1990 levels—the
134. See id. at art. 2.
135. See id. at Annex I (explaining the United States was named an Annex I country).
136. See id. at art. 4(2)(a)–(b) (outlining the process from implementing national policies for
Annex I countries).
137. EPA INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990–2017, 4
(2019).
138. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Feb. 16, 2005, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (implementing affirmative action by signatories to satisfy quantified
emission reduction percentage).
139. See Hersher, supra note 22 (explaining how the United States failed to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol despite playing an “instrumental” role in the drafting of the treaty).
140. See Jessica F. Green, Trump Is Officially Withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement. That
Won’t Change Much, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/2019/10/30/trumps-officially-withdrawing-paris-climate-agreement-that-wont-changemuch/ [https://perma.cc/V4Z5-MSYJ] (“The United States did not join the Kyoto Protocol, and
major emitters such as Canada and Australia either withdrew or did not sign on to its continuation.”);
see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 23, at 107 (listing Canada
and Australia as Annex I countries).
141. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 14.
142. Letter from Todd Stern to Yvo de Boer (Jan. 28, 2010) (on file with author).
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levels initially used under the UNFCCC.143 Even though there was “near
universal” attendance in Copenhagen, the Copenhagen Accord was
regarded as a failure.144
5.

Paris Agreement

Just six years after the Copenhagen Accord, the parties of the UNFCCC
met again and negotiated the Paris Agreement.145 Ironically, the United
States played an integral part in drafting the Paris Agreement, specifically
pushing for more “transparency and accountability.”146 Upon ratification,
the United States became obligated to carry out “economy-wide absolute
emission reduction targets.”147 The targets were individually tailored and
voluntarily pledged by each country.148 Under the Paris Agreement, the
United States pledged to reduce 2005 greenhouse gas emission levels by
more than a quarter before 2025.149
Clearly the obligations under the Paris Agreement offered enormous
flexibility when contrasted with the Kyoto Protocol.150 The Kyoto
Protocol’s centralized enforcement scheme became obsolete by the Paris
Agreement’s decentralized approach, which promoted tailor-made
legislation pursuant to each country’s individual needs and economic
positions.151 However, even the flexibility and country-centered approach

143. Richard L. Ottinger, Introduction: Copenhagen Climate Change Conference—Success or Failure?,
27 PACE ENV’T L.R. 411, 416 (April 2010).
144. See id. at 411–12, 415–16 (explaining frustrations with “large emitters” making insufficient
reduction commitments and resulting in no binding agreement).
145. See What Is the Paris Agreement?, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/
the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/3VHB-3P6D] (“The Paris
Agreement establishes binding commitments by all Parties to prepare, communicate and maintain a
nationally determined contribution (NDC) . . . Parties shall communicate their NDCs every 5 years.”).
146. See Hersher, supra note 139.
147. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties art. 4,
Twenty-First Session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1
(Dec. 12, 2015); see also What Is the Paris Agreement?, supra note 145 (summarizing Article 4 of the Paris
Agreement).
148. See What Is the Paris Agreement?, supra note 145 (using terms like “should” and “encourages
all Parties” when summarizing the Paris Agreement).
149. See Hersher, supra note 139.
150. See Green, supra note 140 (explaining the “flexible framework” of the Paris Agreement only
requires “some action” in the direction of overall “ambitions”).
151. See id. at 2 (“[E]mphasizing national and subnational action, means that climate policy can
be tailored to domestic economic concerns and political constraints.”).
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was not enough to ensure compliance, as the Trump Administration
officially withdrew from the Paris Agreement on November 4, 2019.152
Regardless of the failed, or revoked attempts of the Kyoto Protocol, the
Copenhagen Accord, and the Paris Agreement; the United States is still
responsible for adhering to the UNFCCC reduction standards. The United
States is currently violating the UNFCCC by not having adequate
environmental regulations to reduce carbon emissions to 1990 levels.
6.

Customary International Law—Intergenerational Equity

Intergenerational equity is a prominent international law principal
strongly recognized by the United States. Intergenerational equity invades
the context of environmental law because “the power of the present
generation to unilaterally inflict enormous environmental harm on
generations yet unborn” cannot be unrestricted.153 The pervasive use and
acknowledgment of this doctrine by the United States can be seen in a
plethora of ratified treaties,154 as well as domestic law.155
V. SOLUTION—JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL TREATY RIGHTS UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, treaty violations are identical to
constitutional or federal statutory violations.156 Reverting to judicial
precedence accentuating the Framers’ intent to make treaties law—parallel
to the Constitution—would prevent Juliana-type157 claims from dismissal
under the guise of standing. Juliana-type158 claims encompass an obligation,

152. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the
Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019).
153. See Collins, supra note 12, at 92.
154. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 23, at pmbl.
(“Determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations.”); North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 6, at pmbl. (acknowledging “the importance of
the conservation, protection and enhancement of the environment in their territories and the essential
role of cooperation in these areas in achieving sustainable development for the well-being of present
and future generations”).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012) (ensuring the government will act in a manner conducive to
the preservation of the environment for present and future generations).
156. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
157. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018).
158. Id.
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a breach of that obligation, and an injury.159 Similarly, treaties place
obligations on the United States, and when there is non-compliance with
that obligation resulting in an injury, the injured individual should have a
cause of action before the court.
A. Sufficiency of Treaty Ratification Process
However, enforcement of treaties as the “supreme Law of the Land” has
been severely diluted by the judiciary. Courts have continuously required an
additional step before most treaties can be grounds for a domestic
lawsuit.160 In the words of one Supreme Court Justice, requiring an
additional act of Congress before giving the Supremacy Clause effect would
be a “bold proposition.”161 The constitutional ratification process
combined with the Supremacy Clause, indicates that treaties binding and
enforceable on the United States internationally should also be binding and
enforceable domestically.
“Under U.S. law, a treaty is an agreement negotiated and signed by a
member of the executive branch that enters into force if it is approved by a
two-thirds majority of the Senate and is subsequently ratified by the
President.”162 The two-thirds majority vote of the Senate means that all
treaties must overcome bi-partisanship before ratification by the
President.163 Before reaching the Senate, treaties are negotiated by the
executive branch.164 Although the president can maintain negotiating
power individually, historically, negotiations have involved numerous
congressional members with specialized knowledge of relevant treaty
159. See Complaint at 8, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705
(D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015) (summarizing governmental “actions have caused damage to and continue to
threaten the resources on which [plaintiff] relies for her survival and wellbeing”).
160. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 515, 525–26 (2008) (Beyer, J., dissenting)
(implying the only basis for domestic adjudication of treaty claims lies with Congress to either declare
a treaty self-executing or create federal law recognizing a private right of action).
161. Id. (citing Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 388 (1840) (Baldwin,
J., concurring)).
162. STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 3 (2018); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing
the President “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds
of the Senators present concur”).
163. See Treaties: A Historical Overview, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm [https://perma.cc/ZBG2-B48U] (expressing
bi-partisanship is required for pure change in the realm of treaties) (highlighting the historical nature
of treaties and the ability to have governmental approval).
164. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (making treaties is a constitutional presidential power).
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topics.165 Between treaty negotiation and the two-thirds vote obligation,
the approval of a treaty requires above and beyond any approval required
for any domestic law.166
Therefore, treaties are negotiated by the executive branch, scrutinized and
approved by the legislative branch, and then completely untouchable by the
judiciary without additional legislative approval. The inability of the
judiciary to participate, validate, or enforce treaties seems to go directly
against the coveted checks and balances of the United States government.
The carefully vetted treaty ratification process used to be sufficient to
mandate enforceability of the treaty by the judiciary regardless of selfexecution status.167
B. The Safeguard—The Government’s Ability to Refuse to Ratify Treaties or to
Ratify Treaties Only if the Treaty is Non-Self-Executing
Additional evidence of the sufficiency of the treaty ratification process is
shown by the governments adamant refusal to ratify treaties—or ratifying
only upon the condition that the treaty is rendered basically useless—they
find incompatible with U.S. policy. For example, the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a prominent human
rights treaty, which the United States drug its feet to ratify.168 While the
United States eventually ratified the ICCPR—twenty–six years after
approval by the United Nations—ratification only occurred after the United
States submitted reservations rendering the treaty utterly useless under

165. See Louis Fisher, Treaty Negotiation: A Presidential Monopoly?, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
144, 150–55 (March 2008) (navigating various treaty negotiation examples to demonstrate vast
congressional involvement, especially in recent treaties involving trade).
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (explaining a simple majority—not two-thirds—is required
for either House to conduct business).
167. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961) (enforcing succession rights to individual
property pursuant to an 1881 Treaty between the United States and Serbia); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503, 508 (1947) (recognizing succession rights to property under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Consular Rights between the United States and Germany); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,
485–86 (1879) (“The first part of the article is devoted to personal property, and gives to the citizens
of each country the fullest power touching such property belonging to them in the other.”).
168. See Katrina Ash, U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, n. 13 (2005) (stating 114
countries approved of the ICCPR before the United States became a party 26 years after initial approval
by the United Nations).
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domestic law.169 Specifically, the United States refused to ratify the ICCPR
without making it a non-self-executing treaty.170
The particulars of self-execution status are discussed below. However, a
non-self-executing treaty has no enforceability in the United States judiciary
without an act of Congress.171 Therefore, the simple declaration of a treaty
being “non-self-executing” completely removes a citizen’s ability to bring
any enforcement action against the government despite any violation
thereof.172 While the United States claims to be committed to preserving
an individual’s “right to life,”173 the ability to enforce that right is negated
by the judiciary’s refusal to take any action against violators. Not
recognizing a private right of action leaves the citizens of the United States
unable to hold their own government accountable.
Nevertheless, a declaration against domestic enforcement does not
prevent another country from enforcing ICCPR obligations against the
United States.174 For example, another country could claim the United
States violated Article 6 of the ICCPR for failing to implement appropriate
laws protecting the inherent right to life.175 Even more so, the United
States could be found in violation of “arbitrarily” depriving citizens in other
countries of the right to life by significantly affecting the environment to the
point resources become scarce.176 It seems hard to fathom, but currently,
another country has more power to hold the United States government
169. See id. at ¶ 11.
170. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 23, 1 (102d Sess. 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992);
see also id. at ¶ 17 (summarizing the various reservations and declarations as pre-requisites for
ratification).
171. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008) (encapsulating the elusive definition of
“self-executing” and “non-self-executing” treaties).
172. See id. at 514 (enunciating the requirement that the legislature create a private right of action
in non-self-executing treaties); see also MULLIGAN, supra note 162 (“[M]any treaties and executive
agreements are not self-executing, meaning that implementing legislation is required to render the
agreement’s provisions judicially enforceable in the United States.”).
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing the right to “life, liberty, [and] property”); see also
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS art. 6, March 23, 1976, 99 U.N.T.S.
171 (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”).
174. See United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), April 18, 1946
(authorizing the International Court of Justice to hear legal disputes concerning the breach of
international obligations).
175. See Civil and Political Rights, supra note 58, at 171 (“Every human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law.”).
176. See id. (“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”).
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accountable for their contributions to detrimental climate change than a
United States citizen.177
The United States has also demonstrated the ratification process’s
sufficiency of the by downright refusing to ratify some of the most
prominent human rights treaties to date.178 Most notably, the refusal to
ratify the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).179
These two treaties are overwhelmingly accepted in the international
community.180
Despite an alleged commitment to environmental protection,181 the
United States refuses to ratify a treaty that would guarantee appropriate
measures are taken to preserve the “right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions.”182 These actions are directly adverse to a universally accepted
principle—that everyone has a right to adequate living standards—by

177. See CERTAIN ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY NICARAGUA IN THE BORDER AREA (Nicar.
v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665 (Dec. 16) (allowing Nicaragua to sue Costa Rica over
international environmental law violations); see also WHALING IN THE ANTARCTIC (Australia v. Japan),
Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 348 (March 31) (separate opinion by Cançado Trindade, J.) (allowing
Australia to sue Japan over alleged violations of intergenerational equity, international environmental
law, and international human rights law violations).
178. See Where the United States Stands, supra note 59 (showing the United States signed the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1977, and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child in 1995, but⎯despite near universal acceptance⎯have refused to ratify either
treaty).
179. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976,
993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 6, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]; see also id. (stating “nearly every country in the world
is a party” to the ICESCR and every United Nations member is a party to the CRC except the United
States and Somalia).
180. See Where the United States Stands, supra note 59 (demonstrating near universal acceptance of
the ICESCR and classifying the CRC as “the most widely accepted human rights treaty”).
181. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (2012)
(establishing a broad framework for protecting the environment); see also Pollution Prevention Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 13101 et seq. (2012) (focusing industry, government, and public attention on reducing
pollution through cost-effective changes to energy efficiency and conservation); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2012) (regulating air emissions from mobile sources to protect public health
and welfare).
182. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 179, at 3.
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destroying the very resources necessary to maintain that right.183
C. Irrelevancy of Self-Execution Status
Currently, the ability to bring a private right of action in the United States
depends on whether the treaty is self-executing.184 Relying on selfexecuting treaty status allows the United States to create obligations and
rights while avoiding all liability for non-compliance. A self-executing treaty
is the “equivalent [of] an act of the legislature, whenever it operates by itself
without the aid of any legislative provision.”185 The self-execution doctrine
first appeared in Foster v. Neilson.186 The Foster Court interpreted the treaty
provision requiring the United States to “ratify or confirm” as a promise of
future action.187 The promise of future action means execution by the
legislature before the Court could enforce the treaty.188 However, Foster
was overturned when the Spanish version of the treaty showed the provision
truly read: “remain ratified and confirmed.”189
Conversely, a non-self-executing treaty requires a legislative act before
any obligation under the treaty can be enforced judicially.190 The
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing has created
immense confusion.191 While Congress has the power to issue reservations
expressly stating a treaty is not self-executing,192 many treaties do not
contain any such language. Without express non-self-executing language,
courts have been left to decipher congressional intent to determine selfexecuting status when faced with treaty violations.193
183. See Complaint at 8, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705
(D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015) (summarizing governmental actions that “have caused damage to and continue
to threaten the resources on which [plaintiff] relies for her survival and wellbeing”).
184. See MULLIGAN, supra note 162 (equating self-executing treaties with federal statutes in the
context of judicial enforcement).
185. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829).
186. Id. at 253.
187. See Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 64, at 1125.
188. Id. at 1125.
189. See id. (referencing U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 88 (1833)).
190. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008).
191. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L.
695, 695 (1995) (emphasizing numerous federal court opinions that treat classify this distinction as the
“‘most confounding’ in the United States law of treaties”).
192. See David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing SelfExecuting Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 170 (2012) (referencing the “treaty makers” ability to add
non-self-executing treaty provisions).
193. See Vázquez, supra note 191 at 705 (explaining the “increasing willingness” of courts to
look at legislative history when determining whether a treaty is self-executing).
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The lack of clarity surrounding the distinction between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties is an unnecessary wormhole.194 Instead, the
analysis should require an assessment of the treaty’s subject matter and
whether the litigant is a “beneficiary” under the treaty.195 If a treaty
addresses “traditional private legal rights such as rights to own property,”
the correct place to enforce those rights is before the judiciary.196 Courts
have upheld individual property rights in treaties for over 200 years.197 An
overwhelming majority of those cases involved beneficiary inheritance
rights.198
For over 170 of those years, the Supreme Court recognized an
enforceable private right of action in treaties.199 These actions typically
stemmed from property or inheritance rights.200 For example, the Supreme
Court in Clark v. Allen201 recognized an individual right under the Treaty
on Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights for disposition of realty
Under the public trust doctrine and
through inheritance.202
intergenerational equity, individuals are ultimately seeking preservation of

194. See Vázquez, supra note 64 at 1120 (“[T]he doctrine of self-executing treaties . . . ‘is an
unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several established doctrines that has misled lawyers and courts to
find in it things that were never put there and make it far more than the sum of its parts.’”).
195. Id. at 1116.
196. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 550 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961) (enforcing succession rights to individual
property pursuant to an 1881 Treaty between the United States and Serbia); see also Clark v. Allen,
331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947) (recognizing succession rights to property under the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States and Germany); Hauenstein v. Lynham,
100 U.S. 483, 485–86 (1879) (“The first part of the article is devoted to personal property, and gives to
the citizens of each country the fullest power touching such property belonging to them in the
other[.]”).
198. See Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 198 (enforcing succession rights to individual property pursuant to
an 1881 Treaty between the United States and Serbia); see also Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947)
(recognizing succession rights to property under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular
Rights between the United States and Germany); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 485–86 (1879)
(“The first part of the article is devoted to personal property, and gives to the citizens of each country
the fullest power touching such property belonging to them in the other[.]”).
199. Oona A. Hathaway, Sabrina McElroy & Sara Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing
Treaties in U.S. Courts, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 53, 56 (2012), https://digital
commons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3851 [https://perma.cc/ZFP7-VGZN] (“A private right of action
allows a private party to seek a remedy from a court for the violation of a private right provided by a
treaty.”).
200. Id. at 58.
201. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
202. Id. at 508.
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their inheritance rights to obtain the environment free of climate change
damage.
Intergenerational equity is an acceptable foundation for governmental
liability because it tracks so closely with domestic common law theories.
There is precedence accepting customary international law as part of
domestic law absent controlling executive, legislative, or judicial acts.203
Even though statutes and judicial opinions exist regarding the public trust
concept, none of them are binding enough to create liability.204 However,
the concept of intergenerational equity as customary international law—
reinforced in treaties—is completely binding on the United States.205
D. Unwarranted Presumption Shift
Unfortunately, Medellin v. Texas206 was the turning point of individual
treaty enforcement. Even though the turning point was merely dicta, the
Supreme Court, for the first time, enunciated a presumption against finding
a private right of action in treaties.207 The Court explained that even when
a treaty was self-executing, there was still a presumption that no private right
of action existed.208 In determining self-execution status, the Court
majority held explicit self-execution language is now required.209 Contrary
to precedence finding self-executing provisions absent explicit language, the
majority determined the lack of self-executing language was dispositive.210
Three of the justices issued a strong, compelling dissent against the
presumption shift.211 Justice Breyer encouraged the Court to look at the
203. See MULLIGAN, supra note 164 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) and
referencing Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1996)).
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012) (pronouncing the Federal Government as trustee of the
environment in the context of recovering damages on behalf of future generations, but not creating a
cause of action when the government causes damages); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1)–(2) (recognizing
the present generation as trustee for succeeding generations, but utilizing the word “may” to negate a
basis for a cause of action); Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1102 (Alaska 2014)
(recognizing the legitimacy of the public trust doctrine, but determining that a declaratory judgment
would not provide proper relief or protection for plaintiffs injuries).
205. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (including treaties as the “supreme Law of the Land”).
206. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
207. Hathaway, supra note 199, at 57.
208. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506 n. 3; Hathaway, supra note 199, at 57.
209. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 514 (relying on an early 1819 case finding a treaty non-selfexecuting, only to overrule that decision a few years later and determine the exact same treaty was selfexecuting).
210. Id. at 514.
211. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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opinions written with knowledge of the “Founders’ original intent.”212 The
Founders’ intent to have the Supremacy Clause truly apply to all treaties is
supported by prior Supreme Court decisions finding individual rights under
numerous treaties, covering a wide range of subjects.213
The likely shift in presumption is partially attributed to an emergence of
prominent human rights treaties.214 While the surge of human rights
treaties were drafted long before Medellin, the basic political treaty
apprehension can be traced to the 1950s following the near-universal
ratification of those treaties.215 Human rights treaties providing a
mechanism for individuals to challenge governmental policies was not
something political branches openly accepted.216
E. The Government Unilaterally Holds All the Enforcement Power
Currently, the executive branch enjoys exclusive authority to enforce
treaty violations against state agencies.217 The government also has the sole
ability to enforce environmental violations against offending agencies.218
Individuals are the ones being harmed by environmental violations but have
no recourse to remedy those harms. Even when environmental regulations
expressly provide a private right of action, courts are refusing to
acknowledge individual standing or overturn the EPA’s regulations.219
Considering the United States is responsible for more than a quarter of the

212. Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796)
(explaining Founders’ original intent).
213. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 546 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
214. Hathaway, supra note 199, at 57.
215. See id. at 68–69 (identifying countless treaties prohibiting discriminatory treatment of
humans and Congress’ knee jerk reaction to attempt reverse the Supremacy Clause).
216. See id. at 68 (arguing the “global human rights revolution and the very public backlash
against it provoked increased scrutiny of treaties”).
217. Id. at 101; see Medellin, 552 U.S. at 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Executive has inherent
power to bring a lawsuit ‘to carry out treaty obligations.’”).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2012) (authorizing the President or “authorized representative
of any State” to recover damages under the public trust doctrine); see also Massachusetts v. E.P.A.,
549 U.S. 497, 498 (2007) (recognizing Massachusetts satisfied “the most demanding” standing
requirements of the adversarial process).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2012); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (reiterating that a challenge to an agency’s reasonable statutory construction
centered on “wisdom of the agency’s policy” will fail); New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d
30, 33 (2d Cir. 1981) (acknowledging courts are reluctant to enjoying “activities which have been
considered and specifically authorized by the government” because it implicates complex areas of law).
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entire world’s CO2 emissions,220 something needs to be done to push
substantial reduction before it is too late.
VI. CONCLUSION
Reverting to the pre-Medellin presumption that every treaty is individually
enforceable unless explicitly proven otherwise, aligns perfectly with the
Supremacy Clause. The Founders’ true intent for the Supremacy Clause was
to recognize treaties as the Law of the Land. Not only has the Supreme
Court negated the Founders’ true intent, but the presumption shift is directly
adverse to former precedence. Therefore, individual rights under
environmental treaties should be recognized because they align with the
Supremacy Clause and Supreme Court precedence. Without individual
rights under environmental treaties, environmental claims will likely
continue to meet the familiar demise under the standing doctrine or agency
deference.
Juliana mentions the UNFCCC in the original complaint.221 Citing
Article 2 of the UNFCCC, the complaint alleges:
The minimal objective of the UNFCCC is the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’222

The minimal objective of the UNFCCC became a binding commitment
when the government decided to ratify the treaty. A binding commitment
is an obligation. Failing to adhere to a Constitutional obligation would be
judicially enforceable. Under the Supremacy Clause, it should follow that
failing to adhere to a treaty obligation would similarly be judicially
enforceable.
Leaving the fate of the environment up to the government has proven
ineffective. United States citizens need as much ammunition as they can get
220. See Complaint at 56, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705
(D. Or. Aug. 12, 2015) (“Between 1751 and 2014, the United States has been responsible for emitting
25.5% of the world’s cumulative CO2 emissions to the atmosphere from within its borders.”).
221. Complaint at 55, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705 (D.
Or. Aug. 12, 2015).
222. Id. (emphasis added).
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to promote preservation of the environment. The United States has
recognized the need to preserve the environment and should be held
accountable when they violate preservation efforts.
For more than 30 years, the science has been crystal clear. How dare you
continue to look away and come here saying that you’re doing enough, when
the politics and solutions needed are still nowhere in sight.223

223. See Russell, supra note 1 (quoting Greta Thunberg, U.N. Climate Action Summit).
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